De Sacramentis 1.2.5

1.2.5 “That both goodness and power were present to the divine will.”

But God’s will to create “sharers” in his goodness by itself (at least as an explanation) is not enough: God must also have the power to make his will efficacious. As Hugh’s neat formula (in Deferrari’s translation) has it, “that which [God] willed through antecedent goodness it fulfilled through subsequent power.” Goodness wills, power fulfills.

Between divine will or goodness and divine power, however, Hugh implies the intermediate principle of what he here calls “predestination,” but which the next chapter will call by the more general and familiar name of divine “wisdom,” knowledge, or judgment. Predestination here seems to refer to the act or power of divine deliberation by which God determines what specifically he will create in response to the impetus of divine will that there should be something other than God to which he might communicate something of his own goodness. So, to complete Hugh’s formula, we might say that goodness wills, wisdom distills, and power, finally, fulfills.

To the divine acts of, first, predestination of those things to be created (in which he says divine “goodness operated) and, second, the creation of those things predestined to be created (in which divine “power operated”), Hugh adds a third divine act, that of the beatification of those things first predestined and afterward created (in which both “power and goodness operated together”).


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